Share-tenancy within the household unit by Bøe, Turid
Share-tenancy within the household unit
Turid Bøe
WP 1997: 2
ISSN 0804-3639
.
-I
W orking Paper
Chr. Michelsen Institute
Development Studies and Human Rights
Bergen Norway
Share-tenancy within the household unit
Turid Bøe
WP 1997: 2
Bergen, February 1997
Iiii ~e~~~p~~~~~:~~~ ~~2~~~E
W orking Paper 1997: 2
Share-tenancy within the household unit
Turid Bøe
Bergen, February i 997
Summary:
Virtually all peasant household models assume efficient allocation of household productive
resources between different household activities. In an African context characterised by different
plots of land being cultivated and controlled by different household members, the efficiency
assumption has been shown to be incorrect. In order to capture central aspects of African household
organisation, this paper introduces the "share-tenancy" household model viewing the husband-wife
relationship as a landlord-tenant relationship. The assymetric relationship existing between husband
and wife influences the way they react to changes in exogenous variables and explain the of ten
observed lack of correspondence between changes in producer prices and agrarian output leveIs.
The model also shows how such changes may influence the welfare levels of different household
members in various ways.
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Introduction *
Economic reform programs in developing countries often contain an element labelled
"getting the prices right". By this is meant removal of regulations etc. which result in
distorted price regimes, regimes not reflecting the true alternative cost of resources
and products thus giving wrong signals tothe actors in the economy. As par of the
policy reform taxes are removed and tarffs reduced. The aim is to increase producer
prices in order to enhance production and income. There is, however, a widespread
recognition that the supply response to the liberalisation of prices have been
disappoiriting (Campbell & Wamer, 1997, Evers &Walters, 1998) and that the costs
and benefits tends to distribute unequally between men and women (Elson, 1991).
The motivation behind this paper is to provide a possible explanation for the weak
supply response in an agraran African setting, as well as for the varable welfare
effects. In order to do so an economic model capturing essential aspects of African
peasant households is put forward. Unequal controlover resources and conflcting
interests among famly members are central elements in the modeL.
Economic theorising on famly behaviour normally assumes the family to maximise a
common household function. Traditional agrcultural household models, of which
Singh, Squire & Strauss (1986) is an often quoted example, build upon this
assumption and presume all household land and labour to be pooled and utilsed
according to comparative advantages. As a result the outcome reached is efficient.
Within this efficiency approach, no conflcting interests or disagreements exist.
. I would like to thank Urgurhan Berkok, Ragnhild Balsvik, Bjørn Sandvik and two anonymous referees
for insightful comments. The usual caveats applies.
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Nash-bargaining models brought conflcting interests related to intrafamily
distribution to attention (Manser & Brown, 1980, McElroy & Homey, 1981). These
models addressed distributional conflcts and predicted goods to be distributed
between family members according to the bargaining power of the different members.
The goods bargained over, however, were assumed brought forward by effcient use of
household resources. With regard to production therefore, these models continue to be
efficiency models. The same goes for more general collective approaehes to
household behaviour put forward by Chiappori (1988) and Bourguignon, Browning
and Chiappori (1994). With regard to an African context, though, Urdy (1996) shows
that the conventional pooling model of household resource allocation is false and that
both co-operative bargaining models and the more general model of efficient
household allocations are inadequate for describing the allocation of resources across
productive activities in the household.
In order to capture the African situation, therefore, non-cooperative models of
household behaviour should be considered. Non-cooperative models of family
behaviour point to the fact that individual family members have individual rather than
famly welfare in mind when acting. In deciding upon the control varables under their
command, individuals choose the options maximising their individual welfare even
though such choices might result in inefficiencies reducing family welfare. Non-
cooperative models analysing distributional conflcts within the household encompass
the work of Leuthold (1968), Ulph (1988), Wolley (1988) and Koreman & Kapteyn
(1990). Non-corporate models incorporating household production as well as
consumption include Bragstad (1991), Lundberg & Pollack (1993), (1994) and
Konrad & Lommerud (1995a), (1995b). These models assume each household
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member to control a given resource endowment (labour, land) he or she individually
allocates to private or public good provision. Distribution within marage depends on
these individual resources or the economic value these resources represent for the
spouse.
The anthrùpological literature on agricultural households in Sub-Saharan Africa
documents a wide varety of farng systems. Despite the varation however, one
outstanding characteristic is for men and women of the same household to grow
private plots, controllng the output individually. Household income is usually not
pooled. Another outstanding characteristics is that when households produce both for
the market and for the family, men usually concentrate on cash-crops and women on
subsistence crops. A third characteristic is the gen dere d labour pattern prevailing,
crosscutting the gendered plot structure. This gendered work pattem requires the
individual producer to mobilise famly or extra household labour in order to grow
his/her land. Due to male seniority and the fact that men have ultimate controlover
land, men are more able to mobilse labour than women. Women on their par are
obliged to perform domestic work in addition to their agricultural work. As aresult
women usually work longer hours than men (Koopman, 1993).
Darty Jr. (1995) present a model of agricultural household produetion encompassing
central characteristics of the Sub-Saharan agricultural household organisation. Men
work on the cash crop and seek to maximise their income. They do not contribute to
the subsistence sec tor which is considered "women's work". Women, on the other
hand, have a commtment to perform "female tasks" on cash crop land in addition to
their subsistence obligations. A higher demand for cash crop wil increase the demand
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for female labour within cash crop production. The demand is assumed enforced by a
combination of acceptance of gender norms, female identification with famly interest,
some extra income and force. The effect of increased labour input in cash crop
production is reduced labour input elsewhere and increased effort intensity. However,
given the women's prior commitments to the subsistence sec tor, there is some
minimum inputinto the subsistence sector which may restrict their supply response to
higher demand from the cash crop sector.
Evans and Walter (1998) examne the Darity's model of gender-segregated agrarian
society in light of evidence from U ganda. They find that the rural household
organisation in Uganda fit several of the stylised facts of the Darty modeL. They point
out, however, that the model' s main weakness, which do not appear to fit evidence
from Uganda or elsewhere, is the assumed passivity of women as women are
presumed to act reactive rather than purposive. They suggest, therefore, to include
maximisation of a female objective function and to re-formulate the model in terms
of a bargaining frarework. From a technical side Campbell & Wamer (1997) show
that as formulated, there is no internal maximisation solution possible in the Darty
modeL. Par of the reason they see as the man's assumed abilty to determne the
woman's labour allocation as well as the wage she receive from working the man's
cash-crop land. In their view the best solution to this problem would be to model a
non-symmetric bargaining process within the household.
Balsvik (1995) apply a bargaining framework to analyse supply reaction within
African rural households. She assume, in the same manner as D ar y, men and women
to control independent plots of land and male cash-crop production to be dependent
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upon input of female labour. By applying a bargaining approach she shows that the
woman's supply of labour to male cash-crop production depends upon her bargaining
power, determned by her fall-back position within marage and the probabilty of
divorce.
That women act according to own interests rather than passively fulfiling gender
ideologies, is evident from many par of Africa. Among the Mossi of Burkina Faso in
Western Africa the proverb goes; "women's fields are made at night", indicating the
. men's prominent role in directil!g women's labour toward their own fields (Kevane &
Gray, 1998). When investigating the women's time allocation through interviewing
the women, however, it turned out that the women worked for their husbands
approximately one day a week (Kevane & Wydick, 1998). The divergence between
ideology and reality reveal that the women have been able to lower their work burden
on male land either through bargaining or by utilsing the fact that men, due to the
gen der segregated work, may be unable to control the activities of the women.
In the following a household model characterised by agendered plot and labour
structure is put forward. Men grow cash crops and women food crops. The men
control the cash-crop output and the income derived. The women control the food-
crop harvest and derive their personal incomes from sales of output exceeding famly
consumption needs. In contrast to the Darty (1995) approach, our model assume both
men and women to act purposively and to maximise their individual objective
functions. The main difference between the sexes lies in their access to the productive
resource land. Men have ultimate controlover all household land, both male and
female. This implies that in cases of marage split up, due to divorce or death of the
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lhusband, women lose their access to household land. The women's inferior access
position, however, do not allow men the ability to direct the women's labour power to
their liking as such direction require dose monitoring. The gender segregated labour
pattern prevailing make such monitoring costly.
The share tenancy household model
The fact that household land is a male controlled resource women can gain access to
through a man only, combined with few alternative employment opportunities for
women in rural areas, givesthe man the power to arange the relationship between the
spouses to his benefit. The husband-wife relationship is thus seen akin to a landlord-
peasant, or more generally a principal-agent, relationship. The man, due to his control
over land, can be considered principal whereas the woman, lacking such control, must
be considered agent. Getting marred therefore can be seen as the family version of
entering into a principal-agent relationship. The conjugal or marrage contraet,
specifying the terms between the spouses, acts as the famly version of the principal-
agent contraet. As par of this contract, the man delegates a par of his land to his wife
(wives), getting the right to be fed by her in return. In addition the wife is obliged to
work his plot(s) of land. For this labour supply the woman is compensated by a share
of output produeed.
The share-tenancy household in this paper is modelled as follows. The conjugal
contract gives the woman the right to a par of household land as her private land. On
this land she grows grain which either can be sold in the market or used as input in her
food production. We have assumed no market for ready made food, requiring all food
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to be produced within the household. As compensation for the land the man has the
right to a share of his wife's food production. In order to simplify the analysis, the
amount of land delegated to the woman and the share of the food belonging to the
man is assumed exogenously given, determned by social norms in the society. On the
man's plot, cash-crops (cotton, tobacco, groundnuts, rice et. al) are grown for the
market. Cash-crop is assumed not consumed by the household. In order for the man to
induce his wife to work the cash-crop land, he gives her a share of cash-crop output.
The size of this share is controlled by the man. In addition to working the household
land anddoing domestie labour, the woman can work in the market. The income
deri ved is used to buy market goods, goods the household cannot produee itself. In
order to simplify the analysis the woman is assumed the sole producer of both food
and cash crop. The man is thus seen as a pure landlord renting out his land in
exchange for a share of his wife's output of food and cash-crop.
The model is in spire d by West-African intra-household relations observed in rural
are as going through developments projects and other modernisation approaches aimed
at increasing the degree of commercialisation in the area. In the Gambia a rice project
parly initiated by the government transformed the production of rice from
subsistence, mainly female controlled crop, to a cash-crop controlled by the men. Rice
production, however, continued to be heavily dependent on female labour. In order for
the women to be interested in supplying labour, they had to be compensated either by
controllng some rice land or by getting a share of the paddy produeed. 1 Jf they
received neither, they chose to hire themselves out as wage labourer or concentrated
i To control same rice land is equivalent to a share crop system where the woman gets all the output on
a share of the land.
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on working their dry land crops (Camey & Watts, 1990). For north Cameroon, Jones
(1986), pointed out that women, working on their husbands cash crop fields demanded
to be paid according to their input of labour and that they, rather than working for
their husbands for only nominal compensation, often chose to work on their own less
productive food crop fields or to hire themselves as wage-workers for outsiders. Given
inadequate registration of labour input in the society, payment according to labour
input may in practise imply an output dependent payment scheme. Jones is not dear
on this issue, but her demonstration that women in households controlling more cash-
crop land received a higher rate of compensation than those whose husband cultivate
less such land - for the same amount of time devoted to cash crop production as
recorded by Jones- indicate an output related payment scheme. Among the Mossi of
Burkina Faso women, mared to settlers in a cotton production scheme, were
generally compensated by a portion of the cotton harvest when working on their
husbands cotton fields (McMillan, 1995). Kevane and Gray (1998) also found that
women in cotton producing areas of Burkina Faso were entitled to a share of their
husbands cotton production. In addition the women worked their individual land
and/or worked as labourer in the riarket. The literature thus indicate a setting where
the woman operate as sharecroppers on their husbands cash crop land - receiving a
share of total output as compensation - in addition to working their individual land
and/or working in the market.
The literature indicate also a relative permanent land allocation structure where land is
delegated according to custom and tradition. In spite of male land ownership their
dispositions tend to be circumscribed by social conventions. Changes in land
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allocations tend to arse as response to changes in external factors influencing existing
conventions. Influential external factors in this respect are govemmental initiated
development projects and/or high in-migration resulting in increased cash-crop land
scarcity. The effect of such changes on the women's access to food-crop land is
smaller the more different the types of land required for the two types of production
(e.g. dr land- versus swamp land production). The effect is also smaller the more able
the women are to substitute loss of food-crop land from within the household with
land obtained from outsiders. As land become more scarce, surplus land households
become more interested in renting out land to women as women - as opposed to men -
cannot c1aim permanent land rights to land they have grown (Kevane & Gray, 1998).
The modifying effect of conventions combined with strategies to keep controlover
land by renting it out to women as land become more scarce, circumscribe the
husbands' abilty to choose the amount of food-crop land to delegate to their wives
and render the allocation relatively exogeneous.
Within the model presented the focus is on the husband-wife relationship and on the
goods produced and consumed within the household. As there is no market for ready
made food in the economy, the man's access to food goes through his wife. In such
societies, however, the woman's food production (and consumption) may represent
more than sheer food access for the man. As feeding the famly is a central female
responsibility, the amount of food at the women's disposal is often considered an
important aspect of a woman's general well-being in the society. Furthermore, as the
contract partners in traditional aranged marages are the familes of the spouses
rather than the individuals themselves, marage is in many respects closer to an
economic and political allance between famlies than a personal allance between
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individuals.z Man and wife may as a result be viewed as representatives of their
respective famlies rather than as independent, isolated individuals. The treatment they
receive within marrage wil as a consequence become a concern not only for the
persons directly involved but also a concern for their respective families. By treating
the spouse well, respect and esteem is shown towards his/her kinsfolk. And by
showing respect, good relations are established. In many societies good relations to
one's affinals are essential in order to raise economic and political support needed to
obtain a good living. Bytreating foodproduction as an indicator of the man's relations
to his wife's kin, the amount of food produced influences the man's well-being both
directly via his consumption of food, and indirectly via the establishment of relations
to his wife's kinfolk. The importance of kin relationship can be seen by the tendency
of women, who hold the opinion that their men do not behave as husbands should, to
complain to their fathers and brothers in order to make them intervene. The woman's
kinfolk thus act as an informal court of appeal controllng the terms of the marage
contract and that these terms are adhered to.
Given the share-tenancy framework, the effects of changes in exogenous parameters
like crop prices and the wage rate are investigated. We are interested both in how
individual producers and households react to changes in the price of labour and male
and female products, as well as how individuals and households themselves are
affected by these price changes. Due to the fact that agricultural products are
2 In rural areas in developing countries aranged marriages are far the most common mariage practise
where the families, especially the woman's family, participate in the mariage negotiations on behalf of
their daughter/sister.
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important export products for many African countries, a better understanding of the
mechanisms at work are important also with respect to national income situations.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. First the woman's and thereafter the
man's maximisation problem are presented. When maximising the spouses are
assumed to take the structure of the marrage contract as given. They do not contest or
bargain over the woman's right to control food-grain land, her duty to feed the family
or the man's right to determne the share on cash crop land. Given the husband's and
the wife's optimal adaptation, the effects of a change in the price of cash-crop, food-
crop and the market wage rate are traced.
The woman
The woman is assumed to maximise her utilty function, defined over food, ZV, market
goods, M, and lei sure time, l.
u = (zwt' (MtM uti (1)
In doing so she has to take into account the fact that only a given amount of the food
she produces is consumed by her. Let Z be the total quantity of food produced and l-r
the share belonging to the woman.
Zw = (1- r)Z (2)
The food is produced by combining given proportions of grain and labour time.
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Z = aY = blgz z (3)
where Ygz is the amount of grain used as input in food production and lz time used to
produee food. The time allocated to the different activities leisure, l, food production,
lz' production of cash crop, le, and grain, 19, and time sold in the labour market, lw,
cannot exceed the total amount of time available, L.
l+lz+lc+lg+lw:5L (4)
The income spent on market goods and grain must be smaller than or equal to the
income eamed by working in the labour market and sellng the output from cash crop
and grain production.
M + PgYgz :5 wlw + (1- s)p)'~ + PgYg (5)
Total cash-crop production is denoted by Yl: and the price of cash-crop p c' total grain
produetion by Yg and the price of grain by p g' Market goods M is chosen as
numeraire and M can alternatively be seen as the money income needed to buy market
goods. Equation 5) captures the fact that the woman receives only a share (1- s) of
total cash-crop production.
The woman's problem can now be solved through a two-step procedure. First we
consider her allocation of time to different income generative tasks and thereafter the
allocation of time between market produetion, production for household consumption
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and leisure time. The woman's optimal allocation of labour time to food-crop and
cash-crop production, is the outcome of her profit-maximising strategy with respect to
food- and cash-crop production.
ni((I-s.)p.,h.,w)= Max(l-s.)p.Y ,-wl.i i i (tì i I i i
i = c,g
sc=s,Sg=O (6)
Assuming constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas produetion functions in cash-crop
and food production, Y¡ = hia¡ i?-a¡) , the woman's labour-supply functions becomes.
1
(W 1) ail. = h.i i (l-si)Pi (i-ai) (7)
The woman's labour supply is a function of the supply of land to cash-crop and food-
crop production, hi, the technology parameter, a i ,and the real wage rate. In cash-crop
production this real wage rate wil be "tax" corrected, the tax being the share of the
output going to the man. The woman's output, Y¡, and profit-functions,np are equal
to:
( W )1-~¡Y =h.i i (l-si)Pi(l-ai) (8)
1
. -. 1-- a.
n' = ((1- si)Pi(l- ai))a¡ w ai 1- ~. hi
i
(9)
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By combining equations 2), 3) 4) and 5), given 9), the restrictions become one.
M + PzZw +wl =m (10)
where m = wL + ne + ng and Pz =~(~+ w)l-r a b
The price Pz is a price index for food, where the expression inside the parenthesis is
an index for the Leontieff technology and ¿ is a modification resulting from the fact
that the woman onl y keeps (1 - r) of Z.
Maximising the women's utility function 1) given the restriction 10), the woman's
demand functions for food, market goods and lei sure are given by:
akmXk=-
Pk
k = ZW ,M,l and Pi = w, PM = 1 (11)
The women's demand functions determne her reactions to changes in exogenous
varables. As such they influence the man's maximisation problem. The woman's
indirect utility function becomes:
U* = mO ( )a' a'
aZ M al
where ß = P: (erM)" (-; J (12)
The women's indirect utility function show her maximum achievable utilty at given
prices, income and production parameters.
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The man
In exchange for the use of the land, the husband has the right to obtain a share of his
wife' sproduction of food and cash crop. As a consequence, his utility depends on his
wife's time allocation. By changing the control parameter under his command, i.e. the
tax on cash crop production, s, the man can influence her time allocation.
The man is assumed to maximise his utility defined overhis consumption of food,
zm, and market goods, N, given the restriction that his wife wil not dissolve the
marage contract by divorcing him.
MaxV = v(zm,N)
(sl
(13)
subject to U* ~ K
The constraint is the wife's acceptance condition, given her first order condition for
labour allocation. K is the woman's reservation utility level, the utilty she can receive
by operating outside the marage context. K is assumed exogenously given.
Since the man's control parameter influences his wife's production of both food and
cash crop, he may be unable to secure optimal amounts of both goods and at the same
time push his wife down to her reservation utility leveL. As a result the restriction may
not bind. A non-binding restriction reve als that the woman experiences a welfare level
above her reservation utilty level when mared. This being the case, she has no
incentive to dissolve the marage contract. The man wil thus not have to take the
possibility of divorce into consideration when maximising his utilty, but can
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maximise his unconstrained utility. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas function, inserting
zm = l~r ZW and N = sPc~' the man's utilty function is given by;
V - ( r zw)ø( )i-ø
- l-r SPcYc (14)
Ris first order condition for utilty maximisation is:
c
ø ~ = (1 - ø) a c - Sm S (15)
The second order condition is equal to:
v r nC( ncì a2 J
Vss = (ac (1 _ s )y iØ-; 1--;)- (i-ø )¿(1- s) (16)
The sec ond ordercondition is negative given that ~(1 - ~ ì.: 1- ø al (1- s)m m) ø s
The probabilty that the sec ond order conditon is fulfiled is larger a) the more
unequal the woman's income shares, b) the less the man value food as part of his total
consumption and c) the larger the production parameter ac relative to the share s. In
the following the fulfiment of the sec ond order condition is assumed.
The first order condition for the man's utility maximisation is equivalent to:
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ØElsZm = (1- ø )ElsN (17)
The first order condition for utilty maximisation tells that the optimal tax s is found
by equating the subjective value of the percentage reduction in theman's food
consumption resulting from an one percent increase in the tax rate s with the
subjective value of the percentage increase in his market good consumption brought
forward by the same tax increase. The subjective value parameters are the weights
assigned to food, ø, and market goods, i-ø, as pars of the man's total consumption.
From 15) it follow that s ~ ac . The intuition is that an increase in s wil have two
opposing effects on the man's ability to buy market goods. A higher s wil increase the
man's share of the total income from cash crop production, increasing his buying
power. But at the same time it wil reduce the woman's supply of labour to cash crop
production, reducing the total quantity grown. When s;: ac the negative "production
effect" dominates the positive "share effect" resulting in reduced money income for
the man. He wil thus never choose s;: ac'
Should the restriction be binding is the man's control parameter, s, given by the
woman's acceptance condition. Solving U* = K with respect to s, where U* is given
by 12), the restriction-binding tax rate, s, is found to be;
s~l- w (tr
Pc 1- ac
where Ïc = (t K - wL - ng )(~ 1::c ) (18)
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The nominator, le, is the woman's input of labour to cash crop production when her
utility equals her reservation utility leveL. The restriction-binding tax rate š is larger a)
the smaller the labour input, L e, b) the bigger the input of land, hc, c) the lower the
realwage in cash crop production, w/Pc, and d) the bigger the relative weight of labour
input, 1- a e' in the total output of cash-crop produetion. A lower real wage results
in higher profit and higher income. Higher 1- ae gives higher output per input of
labour into cash crop production, and thereby higher income. A higher income gives
more room for increases in s without the woman reaching her reservation utilty
leveL. A small L e on the other hand implies that the woman, for given lei sure time and
time used to produee food, gets more of her income from sources other than cash crop
production. The smaller her income-share from cash crop produetion, the less is her
- -
total income affected by an increase in s and the more s can increase without
violating the restriction. To see when the restriction wil be binding we use the fact
that the woman' s indirect utility function U* is decreasing in s.
aU*
~ = -tJPeYe o( O (19)
The restriction is binding whenever the tax rate s* solving Vs = O, exceeds the tax rate
-
s, given by 17). The optimal rate s* is given only indirectly by the man's first order
condition, but situations and parameter values making a binding restriction plausible,
can stil be traced. First, parameter values resulting in a big s make it more plausible
for the restriction not to bind. As shown above, a big s is more probable the higher
18
the women's income and the bigger the income share she receives from sources other
than cash-crop production. Secondly, a small a c (makng the right hand side of 15)
zero for a small s, thus making it optimal for the man not to increase the tax rate any
further), wil also increase the plausibiltyof a non-binding restriction. Thirdly, the
more the man values food (or relations to affinals) as par of his total consumption,
that is the smaller the ratio l~Ø , the higher the probabilty of a non-binding restriction.
In order to visualise the man' s problem, think of it in the following way. The man can
be seen as the director of a firm jointly producing the two goods food andmarket
goods. He can thus be seen as facing a transformation curve showing the possible
combinations of the two goods given his wife'soptimal allocation of labour. The
slope of the tangent to a point on the transformation curve is the rate at which one
good must be sacrificed in order to obtain one unit more of the other good without
varing any of the parameters the woman is facing. This slope is the marginal rate of
transformation (MR1) given by;
c
zm~
MRT Z; m
= -- = l )Ns N,ac-s
s
(20)
For tax rates exceeding, ac' the marginal rate of transformation is not defined. The
first and sec ond derivative of MRT with respect to s is positive, ensuring the
transformation curve to be downward sloping and concave. The transformation curve
is given by curve SS in figure 1.
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The man however is not only the director of produetion, but also the consumer of the
produced goods. In order to maximise his utilty therefore, the man's objective is to
find the tax rate s which results in the transformation curve SS being tangent to his
indifferenee curve Il. This condition is fulfiled in the point where the slope of the
transformation is equal to the slope of his indifference curve, given by the marginal
rate of consumption MRS.
MRS = VN = (l-ø)zmVzm ØN (21)
Equating MRT with MRS gives, not surprisingly, the man's first order condition 15).
In ordinary market analyses with exogenously given prices, optimum is characterised
by the marginal rate of transformation being equal to the marginal rate of consumption
which again is equal to the price ratio between the goods in question. Within our
household economy therefore, the first order condition can be seen as the man's
shadow-price ratio between food and market goods. MRT = MRS is given by point
A in figure 1.
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Figure 1
~
zm
s iQ i
zm
i
zml ------------------- ------ --------
s
N
N2 N* Nmax
By changing the tax rate s the man moves up and down the transformation curve, the
maximal s = ac resulting in Nmax. The man, however, might not be able to reach the
first best point A. Whether this is possible or not depends upon the action space open
to him. The action space is determned by the transformation curve in combination
with the woman's paricipation constraint U* = K, which alternatively can be written
m = tK. For given parameter values the woman's reservation income, and thereby
her consumption of food, market goods and lei sure, are given. And sine e the man's
consumption of food depends directly on the woman's food consumption through
Zm = ¿ ZW, a binding paricipation constraint determnes the man's food
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consumption as well. Based on this fact, the woman's paricipation constraint is
represented in figure 1 by the male food consumption leve! it requires3.
The paricipation constraint may or may not bind, dependent upon the amount of food
given by the man's first best solution relative to the amount required by the constraint.
Assurne first that the participation constraint is represented by zm!. This constraint
wil not bind because the man is interested in getting more food (b etter relations to his
affinals) than a binding constraint would result in. On the other hand, a constraint
represented by a food consumption equal to Zm2 wil bind. In this case the man would
have liked to raise the tax rate further in order to get more market goods and less food
but is prevented from doing so because a further increase in s wil push his wife
beneath her reservation utilty leveL. A binding restrction is represented by point D in
figure 1.
Changes in exogenous variables
In this par we want to investigate how changes in exogenous varables affect the
produètive and consumptive activities of the household, as well as individual welfare.
Exogenous varables can change in respons e to changes in e.g. world market prices or
as a function of revised domestic policies. Irespective of the cause of the change,
however, our objective is to investigate how such changes influence household
behaviour.
3 As the participation constraint is not related to the Z", N space, its exact form in this space is
unknown.
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We have chosen to analyse changes in the parameters: price of cash-crop, price of
grain and the wage rate. These parameters are chosen as they determne the money
value of the male controlled cash-crop output, the female controlled grain output and
the women's labour time. Given the gender segregated production and consumption
pattern within the household, effects due to changes in parameters directly related to
male and female activities appear as interesting objects of investigation.
As shown in the previous par, dependent upon whether the restrction is binding or
not, two different adaptations prevail. In order to capture the effects of changing
parameters therefore, we have to distinguish between the restriction-binding and the
non-binding cases.
When the restriction is binding, the man's control parameter, s, is determned by the
woman's acceptance condition. Analytically the effect on s due to parameter changes
can be found by differentiating the woman's acceptance condition with respect to the
parameters in question. These effects, however, are influenced by the assumptions
underlying the woman's reservation utilty level K. Assuming K constant presumes the
woman' s reservation utility level to be autonomous and unaffected by changes in the
parameters of the modeL. This specification may cover situations where unmared
women live together with their kin, takng par in their productive activities and
receiving goods equal to a socially defined utilty level K in return. The alternative to
marrage however, may be for women to live on their own sellng their labour power
in the labour market. In order to feed themselves (and their children) they must buy
grain in the market and transform this grain into food by the use of their unpaid labour
power. The reservation utilty level K wil now be influenced by changes in the wage
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rate, w, and the price of grain, Pg, as wil be spelled out in more detail later. We wil
denote the two situations 'living with kin' and 'living alone'.
Higher price on cash-crop
We star out by examning the effect of a higher price of cash-crop on the man's share
parameter, on household production and individual welfare. First we consider the
situation without a binding paricipation constraint and thereafter the situation when
the restriction is binding.
A non-binding participation constraint.
A non-binding restriction reveals that the women's utilty leve! exceeds her
reservation ùtilty leveL. The tax on cash crop production is thus determined by the
man's unconstrained first order condition for utilty maximisation. The effect of
changes in exogenous parameters on the man's share parameter is traced by
differentiating his first order condition 15) with respect to the varables in question.
as = (1- s) Yc (1 - ~J v 1.( o
()c m m ac(l-s)Vss
(22)
The effect is negative by the sec ond order condition for an optimum given by eq.16).
When the price of cash-crop goes up, the man's income and thereby his access to
market goods goes up as wel1. A higher price has a direct positive effect on his income
by increasing the value of his share of cash-crop output. In addition to this it has an
indirect effect through changes in the woman's produetion of cash-crop. A higher
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pnce increases the woman's profit within cash-crop production inducing her to
expand the produetion. The indirect effect thus reinforces the direct effect, resulting in
a further increase in the man's income. Higher profit within cash-crop production
increases the woman's income as well. The income increase induces her to demand -
and produee - more food. For a given share s therefore the man gets more of both
goods. This change is portrayed in figure 2 by the move from A on the original
transformation curve SS, to B on the new transformation curve S'S'. For nC oe m and s
constant, B is given by the intersection between the new transformation curve and a
straight line through A with a positive slope and a positive intersection at the Zm axis
(see appendix).
Figure 2.
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Due to a higher price on cash-crop both profit, nC , and income, m, goes up. But since
m = wL + nC + rr, the woman's income increases relatively less than her profit
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within cash-crop production. As a result the income from cash-crop production makes
up a bigger share of the woman's total income than before, increasing 1llm. For a
gi ven share s therefore, the man' s shadow price on market goods goes up compared to
his shadow price on food. In figure 2 this is captured by the transformation curve S'S'
being steeper than the curve SS for s constant.
Given that food and market goods are normal goods, higher income induces the man
to demand more of both goods. His increased demand for food versus market goods,
however, does not necessarly correspond to the increased supply of the two goods for
a given s. In order to bring supply in line with demand the tax rate has to be changed.
In B the higher relative price on market goods induces the man to substitute food for
market goods by reducirtg the tax rate. This change is ilustrated by the move from B
to C in figure 2. Compared to the original optimum A, the new optimum C is
characterised by higher consumption of food and rtarket goods and a lower tax on
cash-crop produetion.
A higher price on cash-crop thus increases the man' S access to both food and market
goods and reduces the tax on cash-crop production. The combined effect of higher
price and a lower tax increases cash-crop production and the woman's income. As a
result production as well as male and female welfare are positively affected by a
higher cash-crop price in the non-binding situation. In a situation with no pinding
restriction, therefore, the results from the traditional household model is upheld.
Higher price on cash-crop results in higher production and higher well-being for all
the household members. The produetion elasticity is even larger than predicted by the
traditional models due do the reduction in the tax on cash crop production.
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The participation constraint is binding.
When the woman's participation constraint is binding, the need to keep the wife on
her reservation utility level determnes the (restricted) optimal level of s. In such a
situation the effect on the man's control parameter of an increase in the price of cash-
crop is found by differentiating the woman's paricipation conditon. Due to the fact
that changes in the price of cash-crop have no effect on the woman's reservation
utility level, the situations 'living with kin' and 'living alone' coincide. Analytically
therefore, the effect on the man's share parameter s is given by the differentiation of
U* = K, where U* is given by 12) and K is constant.
as = 1- s :; o
apc Pc
(23)
A higher price on cash crop leads to a higher tax rate. The tax rate increases with the
ratio between the woman's share of cash crop production, 1-s, and the price, Pc' As
shown by the indirect uti lit Y function 12), modifications in the price of cash crop and
the share parameter influence the woman's utilty through changes in her income due
to changes in her profit from cash crop production. Given a binding restriction, it is
optimal for the husband to increase his share of cash crop production with an amount
exactly balancing the positive effect on the woman's income due to a higher price
towards the negative effect on her income due to a higher tax rate. The woman,
experiencing no changes in income or relative prices, experiences no change in her
situation.
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When the restriction is binding, the need to keep the woman on her reservation utilty
level determnes the tax rate s. An increase in the price of cash-crop wil in such a
situation make it possible for the man to increase his share parameter while at the
same time keep his wife at her reservation utilty leveL. By increasing the tax
optimally, the man sips off the total extra income generated by the price increase,
leaving his wife on the same welfare level as before the price increase. Higher price
on cash crop thus benefits the man only. Furthermore, as the woman experiences no
change in her situation, her original labour allocation continues to be optimal,
resulting in the same amounts of cash crop, grain and food being produced as before
the price increase.
In the restriction binding case a higher price on cash-crop gives neither any production
increase nor higher welfare for the woman. These results differ significantly from
results obtained by more traditional household models where both production and all
welfare levels are positively affected.
Higher price on grain
Changes in the price of grain appear at first sight to influence the woman only, as she
is the sole producer of grain. The interrelation existing between husband and wife,
however, renders such an inference incorrect. Through changes in the woman' s
productive activities a linkbetween changes in the price of grain and the man's well
being is established. In order to trace the total effect on produetion, income and
welfare, the man's reactionto grain price changes must be traced.
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The restriction is not-binding;
In the non-binding situation an increase in the price of grain, Pg, induces the man to
increase the tax rate.
~ = _ Yg 7r c VI;: O
dpg m m ac(l-s)Vss (24)
A higher grain price increases the woman's income from grain production thereby
reducing the income share resulting from cash-crop production. Changes in the tax
rate wil as aresult influence her food production less than before. The man's cost of
raising s goes down and he finds it optimal to increase the tax rate.
A higher grain price increases the woman' sincome. At the same time however it
increases the relative cost of using grain as input into food production. Given that the
woman is a net seller of grain, the increase in her income outweighs the increase in the
price of food she is facing. In this case the woman' s demand for all goods - inc1uding
food - expands. Higher food production by the woman results in the man getting more
food at his disposaL. The direct effect of a higher price of grain on the man's well-
being, therefore, is that he gets more food at his disposaL. Contrary to the situation
when the price of cash-crop went up, changes in the price of grain do not influence the
man' s access to market goods. For a constant tax rate, therefore, the change in the
man's situation is given by the shift from A to B in figure 4.
Relative to his optimal combination, the man has now too much food at his disposaL.
In order to transform some of the food iuto market goods the man increases the tax on
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cash-crop production. The change in "relative prices" enhances the tax increase as this
change induces the man to substitute market goods for food. The man's new optimum
is given by C. Compared to A, the tax rate and the man's consumption of market
goods hasgone up. The effect on his food consumption however is indetermnate. It
may decrease or increase dependent upon the size of the initial increase in food supply
(the distance A-B) relative to the change in relative prices. In figure 3 the outcome is
increased food consumption by the man.
Figure 3.
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Should the woman be a net buyer of grain, her income wil be negatively affected by
an increase in the grain price. With a lower income at her disposal the woman reduces
her food consumption and thereby her production. The man wil as aresult get less
food than before. Simultaneously, however, the change in the price of grain changes
the relative price of food and market goods the man is facing. A higher relative price
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on food makes him interested in substituting market goods for food. So by increasing
the tax rate the man reduces his welfare loss.
A higher grain price wil increase or decrease the man' s welfare dependent upon the
woman being a net seller or buyer of grain. With regard to the woman, she toa may
either gain or lose. She wil gain as long as she is a net seller and the positive effect on
her income is bigger than the combined negative effect resulting from a higher relative
price on food and a higher tax rate. With respect to production the result is that output
of grain expands whereas output of cash-crop contracts. The production effects, and
the direct welfare effect stating that the welfare of the producer is dependent upon the
producer being a net seller/buyer of grain, are in line with traditional models. The
effects stemmng from the principal-agent relationship, however, may render the final
welfare effects out of line by allowing for differentiated effects within the household.
The restriction is binding.
Dependent upon the specification of the woman's reservation utility level, it may or
may not be influenced by changes in the price of grain. In order to trace how such
price changes influence wife and husband therefore, the effect on the woman's
reservation utilty level must be accounted for. In the following the two alternative
specifications 'living with kin' and 'living alone' are investigated.
Living with kino
In societies where the alternative for women is to live with their kin, takng par in
their productive activities and receiving a payment equal to a socially defined
reservation utilty level in return, the woman's reservation utility level wil not be
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influenced by price changes. The effect on the man's control varable can thus be
found by differentiating 12) keeping K constant.
as
(Jg
Yg - Ygz
= ~O
Pcl:
for Yg ~ Ygz (25)
An increase in the price of grain wil be followed by an increase in the tax on cash-
crop production given that the woman is a net seller of grain. As in the non-binding
case, when the woman is a net seller, her income goes up following an increase in the
price of grain. This upward shift enables the man to increase the tax rate, shiftng the
woman's utility down until it equals her reservation utilty leveL.
Since the woman is kept on her reservation utility level the only effect on her
consumption pattern is compensated effects due to changes in relative prices. The
price of food has risen compared to the price of market goods and leisure, inducing the
woman to substitute food for leisure and market goods. As a result the woman
produces less food than before.
Given that the woman is a net buyer of grain, her income wil be negatively effected
by an increase in the price of grain. In order to keep her on her reservation uti lit Y level
therefore the man must reduce the tax rate. The effect on the man' s well -being,
therefore, is dependent up on the woman being a net seller or buyer of grain. When she
is a net seller the man wil sip of the income increase brought forward by the price
increase, whereas when she is a net buyer he has to cover up the reduction in her
income.
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A higher price of grain results in more grain being produced. As to the produetion of
cash-crop it wil depend upon the change in the tax rate s. A lower tax enhances the
output produced and a higher one reduces it. These results again depar from more
traditional model result, both with respect to the effect on cash-crop production and by
allowing for person dependent welfare effects.
Living alone
In a society where the alternative to marrage is for a woman to live on her own,
sellng her labour in the labour market, changes in the price of grain influence not only
her situation as mared but her reservation utility level as welL. A woman living on
her own must solve the following maximisation problem;
K(pg, w)= maxk(Z,M,I)
r/, z )
(26)
S.t. M + PzZ +wl:: wL where P,' =( P; + ; J
The woman's indirect reservation utilty function becomes;
K* = wLi) (27)
The effect on the man's share parameter is now found by differentiating U* = K*,
which simplifies to m = wL. In order to adjust the tax optimally, the man has only to
take into account the effect on his wife's income, since changes in relative prices
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influence her reservation utility and her utilty as mared in the same way. Since a
higher price of grain has a positive effect on her income, the tax rate increases.
as Yg
-=-;:0
()g PeYe
(28)
The intuition behind this outcome is that an increase in the price of grain makes it
more expensive for a woman living on her own to buy grain in order to make food.
The female reservation uti lit y level goes down. Irespective of the woman being a net
seller or buyer of grain therefore, in order to push her down to the new lower
reservation utility level, the man increases the tax rate. The outcome, that a higher
price on grain decreases the welfare level of some of the household members, stands
in opposition to the win-win outcome presented by traditional models.
A high er wage rate
Changes in the wage rate are similar to changes in the price of grain in that they
influences the man only indirectly through changes in the woman's productive
activities. Should the woman enjoy a utilty level exceeding her reservation level, a
higher wage rate increases the tax rate unless the woman' sincome is severely reduced
by the wage increase.
. as 11 ( 11 e ( )JJ V 1
:1. = - le +- L-le -lg ( _ )vw m m ae 1 s Vss (29)
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A higher wage reduces the woman's profit from cash crop and grain production and
thereby the production of both cash-crop and grain. On the other hand it increases the
woman's income from sale of labour to the market. Given that the woman is a net
seller, her income goes up when the wage rate goes up. In this case a higher wage rate
reduces the man's shadow price on market goods, inducing him to increase the tax
rate. Even when the woman is a net buyer of labour the man may find it optimal to
increase the tax rate in response to a wage increase. This is so when the reduction in
the woman's income is smaller than the reduction in her profit within cash-crop
production. The man's shadow price on market goods goes down compared to his
shadow price on food, making it optimal for him to increase the tax rate. Only if the
woman is such a big buyer of labour that her income is reduced proportionally more
than her profit within cash-crop production, the man finds it optimal to reduce the tax
rate.
A rising wage may thus result in situations where both the man and the woman are
positively/negatively affected. Dependent upon the relative changes in profit, income
and the tax rate, situations in which one of them wil gain while the other wil lose are
also possible.
Living with kin
Should the restriction be binding and the alternative to marage be for the women to
live with her kin, a rising wage rate wil be followed by a higher tax on cash-crop
given that the woman is a net seller of labour.
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To keep his wife on her reservation utility level the tax rate must be modified to
cancel out any effects on her utilty. When the woman is a net seller her income goes
up makng room for an increase in the man's control varable, whereas when she is a
net buyer the man must reduce the tax rate in order to compensate for the income
reduction the woman otherwise would encounter.
Again the only effect on the woman's consumption pattern is due to changes in
relative prices. This time both the price of food and leisure have gone up compared to
the price of market goods, resulting in increased demand for market goods by the
woman. Her demand for food and leisure time wil both go down, unless the reduction
in one of them is so large that it makes room for an increase in the other.
As in the non-binding case a higher wage wil reduce the profit from, and thereby the
production of both cash-crop and grain. Jf the tax rate goes up in respons e to the wage
increase the production of cash-crop wil be further reduced.
Living alone
An increase in the wage rate increases the income of single women, thereby increasing
the reservation utility level of all women. For a women to be wiling to stay within
marage therefore, her utilty level as mared must increase with the same amount as
her reservation utility leve!. The man wil thus have to reduce the tax on cash-~rop
production.
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One interesting lesson to be drawn from the effects of a higher wage or grain-price is
that the woman's situations is not necessarly improved as a result of a positive shift
in prices of the goods she is sellng. Whether or not the women wil benefit depends
upon the men's ability and wilingness to counteract any positive effects by adapting
the terms of the husband-wife 'exchange'.
Conclusion
By modellng the household economy as a share-tenancy relationship new insight
regarding the relationship between parameter changes and household behaviour is
gained. In situations where women perform housework as payment for access to
individual land and in addition work as share-croppers on their husbands cash-crop
fields, the effect on both productive activities and individual welfare may differ from
the results obtained by traditional peasant household models. Furthermore, within the
share-tenancy model, the results obtained depend on the exact parameter being
changed and on the restrictions on the husband-wife relationship.
A higher price on cash-crop, the male controlled output, does not increase produetion
in situations characterised by the man keeping his wife on her reservation utility leveL.
In restriction-binding situations the woman gets no incentives inducing her to increase
the production, and output stays unchanged. By incorporating unequal controlover
resources and divergent interests within the household, therefore, the apparent lack of
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connection between producer prices and production responses of ten observed within
developing countries, becomes explainable.
With respect to welfare effects, a higher price on cash-crop benefits both the man and
the woman in situations characterised by a non-binding paricipation constraint. A
binding constraint on the other hand results in the man being the only one to benefit.
By keeping his wife on her reservation utility level, the man extracts all the extra
income generated.
Intuitively one would expect an increase in the price of grain, the female produced and
controlled crop, to benefit the female member of the household. This may not be so.
When the woman's participation constraint is binding the woman is kept on her
reservation utilty leve!, and any welfare increases are experienced by the man only.
Moreover, if the increase in the price of grain reduces the woman's reservation utility
level, as in the scenario 'living alone', women find themselves negatively affected by
the price increase. Should the restriction not bind, the effect on individual welfare is
indeterminate. Situations where the man is gaining and the woman losing or vice
versa, as well as situations where both are gaining or losing, are all possible.
When the alternative for women is to live on their own, sellng their labour power in
the market, a higher female wage rate improves the situation for all women by raising
the female reservation utility leveL. Should the reservation uti lit Y leve! be unaffected
by changes in the wage rate, as in the scenaro 'living with kin', wage rate changes do
not influence the female utilty leveL. A non-binding restriction results again in
indetermnate welfare effects.
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The conc1usion to be drawn is that higher 'family income' does not guarantee higher
welfare for all family members. Who is to benefit from the increase depends both on
how the increase came about as well as on features characterising the marage
arangements and/or the surrounding society. Important aspects determning the
characteristics of the surrounding society are the importance of establishing good
relations to one's affinals and the cohesion of family ties. As pointed out earlier, good
relations to affinals may have important economic implications in traditional societies.
The more such relations are established through good treatment of this family's
representative (the wife), the higher the probabilty that the society is characterised by
marred women enjoying a utility level exceeding their reservation utilty leveL. In the
words of the model, the more the husband values food as par of his total
consumption, the higher the probabilty of a non-binding restriction. Given that a non-
binding restriction is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition making it possible for
women to benefit from changes in exogenous parameters in the 'living with kin'
scenario, the economic importanee of good relations to affinals may be used as an
indicator of the effect of parameter changes on the situation of women.
Furthermore, the more coherent the cognatic family ties, the higher the probability that
unmared women live with their kin and take par in their productive activities. In
restriction-binding situations, the female utilty level is unaffected by changes in
exogenous parameters and women are secured a given, basic utility level irrespective
of such changes. Loosening of family ties leading to more single women takng up
residenee of their own, destroys this invariability and exposes the women to changes
in their welfare leveIs, both positive and negative.
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Comparing the results obtained by the share-tenancy household model with the
conventional wisdom obtained by traditional peasant household models, shows that
whereas traditional models account for situations characterised by higher prices
resulting in higher production and welfare, the share-tenancy model captures these
situations as well as situations characterised by stagnating production and uneven
welfare effects. More specifically the modeloffers an explanation accounting for
weak correlation between producer prices and output leveIs.
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Appendix
With a non-binding restriction we show that for a constant tax rate, s, the expansion
path due to changes in pc is a straight line with a positive slope independent of pc and
a positive interception at the Zm axis, independent of both s and pc'
A straight line going through (Ni, Zim) and (N z' Z;) is given by the formula;
(zm -Zlm) = ~m =~m (N-Ni)z i
zm _ Zm
Denote a = z i and b = Zim - aN1
Nz - Ni
Making use of the fact that Ni = SPYi
where Y¡ = Pii--Ih(l-s)i--I(l-ar~-lwl-i- i = 1,2,
and m r a ( g ( )LI ( )1. i-L. i)Zi =-~ wL+n +ha l-a a 1-s aw ap/
1- r Pz
i = 1,2,
and where for simplicity a c = a, P c = p, hc = h
the slope becomes: a=a-raz (l-s):;O1- r Pz s
The slope is independent of p.
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The intersection point at the Zm axis is given by:
b = -- a Z (wL + ng + nC - a(l- s)pYc)'
1 - r pz
nC
Using the fact that r: = ( )
1 - s pa
we conclude that:
b = -- a z (wL + ng)
1- r pz
The interception point is independent of both s and p, and is positive for
wL + ng ;: O, which is equivalent to nC oe m.
For nC oe m and s constant therefore, point B = (N 21, Z;) is at the intersection
between the new transformation curve and a straight line going through
A = (NI' Z;) characterised by a positive coefficient and a positive intersection
point.
42
References:
Adam D.W. and N. Rask, 1968, Economics of cost-sharng leases in less-developed
countries, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 50, 935-945.
Balsvik, R., 1995, Production decisions in nonpooling households, Memorandum
from department ofeconmics, no. 7., University of Oslo, Norway.
Bamum, H.N. and L. Squire, 1979, A model of an agricultural household: theory
and evidence, Occational Paper no. 27, World Bank, Washington D.C.
Becker G., 1965, A theory of the allocation of time, Economic Journal 75, pages?
Bourguignon F., M. Browing, and A. Chiappori, 1994, The collective approach to
household behaviour, Mc Master University, Working Paper no.95-05.
Bragstad, T., 1991, Private provision of a public good - The significance of
thresholds, mimeo, University of Oslo.
Bukh, J., 1979, The vil age woman in Ghana, Scandinavian Institute of African
Studies, Uppsala.
Campbell, D.A. and J.M. Wamer, 1997, Formally modellng a gender-segregated
economy: a response to Wiliam Darty, Jr., World Development, vol 25, no. 12, pp
2155-2158.
43
Camey, J. and Watts, M., 1990, Manufacturing dissent: work, gender and the
politics of meaning in a peasant society, Africa 60,207-241.
Chiappori, P.A., 1988, Rational household labour supply, Econometrca 56, 69-90
Darty Jr., W. 1995, The formal structure of a gender-segregated low-income
economy, World Development, 23, 11, 1963-1968.
Davison, J., 1988, ed., Agriculture, woman and land; The African Experience,
Boulder,Colorado, Westview Press.
Elson, D., 1991, Male bias in the development process: an overview, in: D. Elson,
ed., Male bi as in the development process, (Manchester University Press).
Evans, A., 1991, Gender issues in rural household economics, IDS Bulletin 22,
no. 1, Institute of Development Studies, Sussex.
Evers, A. and B. Walters, 1998, The model of a gender-segregated low-income
economy reconsidered: evidence from U ganda, (forthcoming in Review of
Development Economics).
Folbre, N., 1986, Hears and spades: new paradigms of household economies,
World Development 14, no 2,245-255.
Folbre, N., 1986, Cleaning house: new perspectives on households and economic
development, Journal of Development Economics 22, 5-40.
44
Guyer J.I., 1984, Naturalism in models of African production, Man 19, no.3, 371-
88.
Guyer J.L, 1988, Dynamc approaches to domestie budgeting; cases and methods
from Africa, in: D. Dwyer and J. Bruce, eds., A home divided; woman and income
in the third world (Stanford University Press).
Hemmng-Gapihan G.S., 1982, International development and the evolution of
women's economic roles; a case study from northern Gulma, Upper Volta', in: E.G.
Bay, ed., Woman and work in Africa, (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press).
Kabeer, N., 1991, Gender, produetion and well-being: rethinking the household
economy, Discussion Paper no. 288, Institute of Development Studies, Sussex.
Kevane, M.and L. Gray, 1998, A woman's field is made at night: gendered land
rights and norms in Burkina Faso, forthcoming in Feminists Economics.
Kevane, M. and B. Wydick, 1998, Social norms and the time allocation of women's
labor in Burkina Faso, mimeo, Dept. of economics, Santa Clara University.
Konrad K.A and K.E. Lommerud, 1995a, Family policy with non-cooperative
families, Scandinavian Journal ofEconomics 97, no 4, pages?
45
Konrad K.A and K.B. Lommerud, 1995b, The bargaining famly revisited, mimeo
University of Bergen, Norway.
Koopman, J., 1993, The hidden roots of the African food problem: looking within
the rural household, in: N. Folbre, B. Bergman, & B. Agarwal, eds., Woman's work
in the world economy (Macmillan Press Ltd.).
Kooreman, P. and A. Kapteyn, 1990, On the empirical implementation of some game
theoretie models of household labor supply, Journal of Human Resources 25, 584-98.
Leuthold, J., 1968, An empirical study of formula income transfers and the work
decisions of the poor, Journal of Human Resources 3, 312-23.
Lundberg, S. and R.A. Pollack, 1993, Separate spheres bargaining and the marage
market, Journal ofPolitical Economy 101,132-37.
Lundberg, S. and R.A. Pollack, 1994, Noncooperative bargaining models of marage,
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 84, 132-37.
Manser M. and M. Brown, 1980, Marage and household decision making: A
bargaining analysis, International Economic Review 21, 31-44.
McElroy, M.B. and M.J. Horney, 1981, Nash-bargaining household decisions;
towards a generalisation of the theory of demand, International Economic Review 22,
333-49.
46
McMilan, D., 1995, Sahel visions: planned settlement and river blindness control in
Burkina Faso, Tueson, The University of Arizona Press.
Roberts P.A., 1988, Rural women's access to labour in West-Africa, in: S.B.
Stichter and J.L. Parart, eds., Patriarcy and dass: African woman in the home and
workforce (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press).
Singh, L, Squire, L. and Strauss J., eds, 1986, Agricultural household models;
extensions, applications and policy, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press)
Singh, N., 1989, Theories of sharecropping, in: P.Bardhan, ed., The economic
theory of agrarian institutions (Clarendon Press, Oxford).
Staudt K., 1987, Uncaptured or unmotivated? Woman and food crisis in Africa,
Rural Sociology 15, no.l, pages?
Ulph, D., 1988, A General non-coòperative Nash model of household behavior,
University of BristoL.
Urdy, C., 1996, Gender, agrcultural production and the theory of the household,
Journal of Political Economy 104, no.5, 1010-1046.
Woolley, F., 1988, A non-cooperative model of family decision making, Discussion
Paper no. TIDl 125, London School of Economics.
47

Recent W orking Papers
WP 1995: 4
WP 1995: 5
WP 1996: 1
WP 1996: 2
WP 1996: 3
WP 1996:4
WP 1996: 5
WP 1996: 6
WP 1996: 7
WP 1996: 8
WP 1996: 9
WP 1996: 10
WP 1996: 11
WP 1996: 12
WP 1996: 13
WP 1996: 14
WP1997: 1
FJELDSTAD, Odd-Helge
Taxation and tax reforms in Tanzania: A survey. Bergen, November 1995, 35 pp.
FJELDSTAD, Odd-Helge
Valued-added taxation in Tanzania? Bergen, November 1995,27 pp.
STOKKE, Hugo
Institutional approaehes to the study of international organisation. Bergen,
February 1996,23 pp.
TJOMSLAND, Marit
A discussion of three theoretical approaehes to modernity: Understanding
modernity as a globalising phenomenon. Bergen, July 1996,24 pp.
KNUDSEN, Are 1. and Kate HALVORSEN
Income-generating programmes in Pakistan and Malawi: A comparative review.
Bergen, August 1996.
FJELDSTAD, Odd-Helge
Bistand og næringsutvikling. Noen kommentarer til St. meld. nr. 19 (1995-96).
Bergen, august 1996, 17 s.
RAKNR, Lise and Tor SKÁLNES
Political institutions and economic reform: Zambia and South Africa in
comparative context. Bergen, September 1996,44 pp.
RAKNR, Lise
Rational choice and the problem of institutions. A discussion of rational choice
institutionalism and its application by Robert Bates. Bergen, September 1996, 31
pp.
ARIFIN, Bustanul
Economic analysis of land degradation in Indonesia up land. Bergen, September
1996,20 pp.
PAUSEWANG, Siegfried
"Eneweyay" (Lets Discuss). Bergen, September 1996.
ANGELSEN, Arild
Deforestation: Population or market driven? Diferent approaehes in modellng
agricultural expansion. Bergen, September 1996,30 pp.
ANGELSEN, Arild and Richard Culas
Debt and deforestation: A tenuous link. Bergen, September 1996,29 pp.
KNUDSEN, Are J.
Deforestation and entrepreneurship in the North West Frontier Province,
Pakistan. Bergen, October 1996,22 pp.
NORDÅS, Hildegunn Kyvik
Trade and growth with statie and dynamic economies of scale. Bergen,
November 1966, 36 pp.
LØNNING, Dag Jørund
Dealing with the good and the evil. Introducing morality as an anthropological
concern Bergen, December 1996,27 pp.
FJELDSTAD, Odd-Helge
Tax evasion and corruption in local governments in Tanzania: Alternative
economic approaehes. Bergen, December 1996, 33 pp.
SUMAILA, Rashid Ussif
Strategic dynamic interaction: The case of Barents Sea fisheries. Bergen,
January 1997.
